DEMOSTHENIC STYLE

IN THE

PRIVATE ORATIONS

THESIS

PRESENTED TO THE BOARD OF UNIVERSITY STUDIES
OF THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

WILLIAM HAMILTON KIRK

BALTIMORE, 1895.

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DEMOSTHENIC STYLE IN THE PRIVATE ORATIONS.

I.—Establishment of Tests.

Of the sixty speeches which have been handed down to modern times under the name of Demosthenes, forty-two (Orr. 18–59) are pleadings before a court; and of these again twenty-nine (27–50, 52–56) are more nearly defined as *λόγοι ἰδιωτικοί*—a term which has no exact equivalent in English, and which, even in Greek, is not absolute in its definition, since Or. 51 (*περὶ τοῦ στεφ. τῆς τριηραρχ.*) in all manuscripts, and in some Orr. 57–9 (*πρὸς Εὐβουλίδην, κατὰ Θεοκρίνου, κατὰ Νεαίρας*), appear in this class (Blass, Att. Ber. III 49–50).[1] This uncertainty is reflected in the pages of Blass, in whose index these four orations are entered under the heading *Privatreden*, although in his remarks on 58 and 59 (III 440, 476) he emphasizes the fact that they belong among the *δικανικοὶ δημόσιοι*. Or. 57 he qualifies (III 429) as being in character, though not by strict construction, a private speech, and he seems half inclined to yield a like place to Or. 51 (III 215). But the latter was delivered before the Athenian Senate, and its theme is the claim to a public distinction; the former is addressed to an ordinary court, and, although connected with a public measure, deals with matters of an essentially private nature; I have therefore followed Blass in including it among the *ἰδιωτικοί*, while leaving 51 in the class to which it formally belongs.

The question how many of these speeches may be considered Demosthenean has been variously answered, and certainly with more reasonableness by Blass, who reckons fourteen (including 57) than by the more destructive among modern critics. The first speech against Stephanus, Or. 45, has been a great stumbling-block, and Arnold Schäfer's objections to its morality blinded him to the beauties of its style; but Blass has given a plausible

[1] Cited by the pages of the first edition.

reason for the advocacy of Apollodorus by Demosthenes, and stylistically the speech refuses to be excluded. Schäfer's arguments against the genuineness of the third speech against Aphobus, Or. 29, have been sufficiently, though not exhaustively, refuted by Blass; and his view, which was also that of Westermann, that this speech is the forgery of a late rhetorician, is wholly untenable, as well for this as for any other of the private orations. The most marked feature common to all, to the obviously spurious no less than to the admittedly genuine, is their character of reality. They deal with cases, and enter into details, such as no forger would have been at the pains to handle or invent; the poorest among them is instinct with that breath of life which literature draws only from contact with fact; and the purity of their Attic dialect gives final assurance that those which are not by Demosthenes himself must be attributed to contemporaries of his and to the best period of Attic oratory.

For distinguishing the genuine from the spurious, or for assigning certain of the latter to a possible common author, vocabulary is an aid to be used with much caution. Two influences conspired to keep the language of these brief compositions as nearly as might be on a level with the ordinary phraseology of educated Athenians: first, their intensely practical spirit and purpose; and secondly, the fact that at Athens a suitor usually pleaded his own case, and often did so in a speech prepared for his inexperience by some trained and practised orator. Dionysius of Halicarnassus dwells on the art with which Lysias assumed the layman; the stronger genius of Demosthenes showed an even more wonderful pliancy in this respect; and if inferior speech-writers[1] were incapable of achieving a like delicate perfection, they were certainly guided by the same general conception of fitness. Individuality of expression must have been further obscured by a rhetoric which prescribed stock arguments and reflections and allowed set formulas of introduction or conclusion; and when we remember how little remains out of an immense mass of oratory

[1] It is to be regretted that in English the word logographer should be employed, after Thuc. 1, 21, to denote writers of history. The Greek λογογράφος usually signifies one who wrote speeches for others to deliver; and we need both logograph and logography to express a practice which is never to be left out of sight in considering the forensic oratory of the Athenians, and which had much to do with its unrivalled excellence.

subjected to this rhetoric, we may hesitate to find evidence for individual authorship in the coincidence of phrases often essentially commonplace. In his attempt to show that one man was the author of the speeches against Macartatus, Euergus and Olympiodorus, as well as of those in behalf of Apollodorus (excepting the first against Stephanus), Blass has not only laid undue stress (III 496, 500–1) on such coincidences, but has sometimes neglected to observe that expressions which he reckons distinctive are to be found in compositions of other authorship. Thus the predicative use of ἐξ ἀνάγκης can be paralleled from Isaeus, 2. 22 and 3. 65; for the combination of εὐθύς or εὐθέως with παραχρῆμα compare 1. 11 and 3. 7. 48 of the same author and Dem. 29. 15; in Dem. 15. 7 and 39. 24 we find ἀκόλουθος in the sense in which Blass quotes it for 46. 17 and 48. 4, or, if he insists on an impersonal neuter, we can point to Ep. 3. 10, where, however, the construction is with the genitive, not the dative. That ἔστι δὲ βραχὺς ὁ λόγος is a mere formula is plain from the variations found in 3. 23, 21. 77. 160, 34. 3 (compare also 18. 196 and Lys. 24. 10, οὐ πολὺς ὁ λόγος, sc. ἐστί); it can hardly be that the critic attaches importance to the particular form in which this trivial sentence is cast. The essential difference between the introductory sentences in 43. 31, 48. 33, and those in 27. 13, 29. 39, 54. 6 lies in the greater neatness and compactness of the Demosthenean formulas; but all are shaped on the same model, and it cannot surprise us that at a lower level of art there should be less variety of execution. Distinctions of style fade with a decrease in artistic power and refinement; and even if the common authorship for which Blass argues is not improbable, it cannot properly be maintained on the ground of stereotyped expressions or literary imperfections which may belong as easily to several inferior writers as to one alone. Even in larger spheres of comparison the importance of vocabulary as an index of style lies chiefly in the tone and spirit which words convey; otherwise, the difference between prose and poetry would be in the main a mechanical one, which, with the Greeks, it never was.

This protest against an occasional over-interpretation of unimportant phenomena does not affect the sense of obligation which I, in common with all students of Demosthenes, feel to the great work of Blass. The German critic has usually trodden a surer path and taken a broader sweep; that it is still possible to glean

where he has reaped, I hope to show in the following pages, where I shall first take note of certain traits of Demosthenic style exhibited in the fourteen private speeches accepted as genuine, and shall then, after a glance at Lysias and Isaeus, proceed to examine, from the point of view thus gained, some of the doubtful orations. And I shall begin by calling attention to a class of words which stands in intimate relation with the tone of the orator, and the use or omission of which may fairly be said to have an artistic value and effect.

Denunciation.

This is what may be termed the vocabulary of denunciation, which comprises words expressive of the adversary's baseness or impudence. Such are the adjectives *ἀναιδής* (36. 33, 37. 3. 27, 54. 38), *ἀναίσχυντος* (27. 18, 29. 53, 55. 28), *πονηρός* (45. 80, 54. 24, 55. 30), *κακός* (30. 4, 45. 4), *ἄδικος* (29. 27, 30. 4, 36. 55, 45. 80), *φαῦλος* (37. 50), *μιαρός* (36. 58, 37. 48), *βδελυρός* (54. 22), *ἀνόσιος* (28. 16), *ἀκάθαρτος* (37. 48), *σχέτλιος* (29. 19, 30. 46); the adverbs *ἀναιδῶς* (27. 16. 24. 62), *αἰσχρῶς* (27. 57. 62, 29. 49), *ἀδίκως* (57. 5), *πλεονεκτικῶς* (57. 5); the substantives *ἀναίδεια* (27. 22. 24. 31. 34, 29. 1, 31. 6, 36. 61, 37. 45, 45. 44. 71. 73, 54. 37, 55. 8, 57. 64), *ἀναισχυντία* (27. 38. 64, 38. 5), *πονηρία* (27. 26, 36. 56, 45. 2, 54. 37), *αἰσχροκέρδεια* (27. 38. 46, 29. 4, 45. 2), *πανουργία* (29. 51, 30. 24), *μιαρία* (29. 4), *κακουργία* (45. 39). To these may be added the verbs *ἀναισχυντεῖν* (29. 57, 45. 44) and *πανουργεῖν* (29. 5). I omit such words as *ὕβρις* and *ἀσέλγεια*, which are specifically applicable to cases of violence, and cite only those passages in which the term of reprobation appears as a clear and frank expression of the speaker's own sentiments concerning his adversary.

An examination of this list reveals two facts worthy of note; the first, that Orr. 39 (the first against Boeotus) and 41 (*πρὸς Σπουδίαν*) are absent from it; the second, that the proportion of denunciatory expressions is larger in the speeches delivered by Demosthenes himself than in those composed at a later period for clients. The five orations, 27–31, contain thirty-one such words against thirty-four to be found in seven other speeches; and fifteen occur in Or. 27 (*κατὰ Ἀφόβου α'*), ten in Or. 29, while Or. 45, longer than either of these and extraordinarily bitter in tone, has not more than eleven. It would seem that in his youth Demosthenes gave a freer rein to the passion which seeks issue in vigorous and down-

right abuse, while later he learned to clothe the same sentiment in a more refined and subtle expression. The triumph of this refinement is seen in the first speech against Boeotus, where, without the employment of any harsh word, the adversary is loaded with scorn and rebuke. The cause lies in the *ἠθοποιία*[1] of the speech; Mantitheus, whose case has no support in law, wishes to arouse in the judges a sense of what is fair and considerate; accordingly he poses throughout as a person of scrupulous fairness, and displays an ostentatious consideration for the rights and feelings of a brother whom he despises and repudiates, while admitting and satisfying his legal claims. Recalling the situation presented in Or. 41, we may trace there the influence of the same element. A respectable citizen of mature years has a dispute about property with Spudias, the husband of his wife's sister; he regards Spudias as a litigious individual (§2 *πολλάκις—εἰθισμένος*, §24 *ὅσῳ—παρέρχεται*), and does not hesitate to speak his mind about the course pursued by him (§29–30 *διὰ ταῦτα κ. τ. ἑ.*); but as there is no other quarrel between them, and obviously no desire on his part to envenom this and destroy all harmony in the family, the respectable man refrains, in rather a dignified way, from using harsh and unpleasant epithets.

Repetition.

Rhetorical figures belong to the common stock of oratory; but some of them at least possess, or are capable of receiving, such

[1] By this term I wish to denote the expression in the writer's style of the speaker's personality; it applies only to those speeches which were written for others to deliver, and has nothing to do with characterizations of a third person (*χαρακτηρισμός*). Thus in the speech for Phormio (36) the *ἠθοποιία* lies only in the complete self-suppression of the advocate; in such speeches as those against Pantaenetus and Conon the mental lineaments of the speaker are in a measure revealed to us. Of course, this reflection of character in style is an artistic, not an absolutely truthful, one. For this somewhat arbitrary use of an elusive and ill-defined word I find support in Nicolaus Sophistes, Progymn. in Spengel Rhet. III 489: *ἠθοποιία ἐστὶ λόγος ἁρμόζων τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἦθος ἢ πάθος ἐμφαίνων ἢ καὶ συναμφότερα · ἁρμόζων μὲν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἐπειδὴ δεῖ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ πρὸς ὃν λέγει · ἦθος δὲ καὶ πάθος ἢ καὶ συναμφότερον, ἐπειδὴ ἢ πρὸς τὰ καθόλου τις ἀποβλέπει ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἐκ περιστάσεως γινόμενον.* The idea here conveyed is not always easy to distinguish from that implied in the term *τὸ πρέπον*; but the definition is more consistent and satisfactory than those which confound *ἠθοποιία* on the one hand with *προσωποποιία*, on the other with the purely moral *ἦθος*.

distinctive tone and character as to cast light on the mental qualities of the writer who uses them. Among the figures of speech (*σχήματα λέξεως*) employed by Demosthenes, Blass notices repetition in its various forms. Of these, epanadiplosis[1] is not very common in the private speeches; I have observed only seven examples: *οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτ' οὐκ ἔστι*, 27. 57, 29. 49; *βοηθήσατ' οὖν ἡμῖν βοηθήσατε*, 28. 20; *οὐ μὰ Δί' οὐχ*, 29. 59; *τοῦτο δὴ τοῦτ'*, 41. 22; *ἀλλ' οὐχ οὑτοσὶ Σ. οὐκ ὤκνησε*, 45. 56; *πονηρὸς ὦ ἄ. 'Α. πονηρὸς οὗτος* 45. 80. Anaphora is much more frequent, either in asyndeton—which is decidedly the strongest form—or with connectives, usually *μὲν—δέ*. Of the asyndetic arrangement we find examples, with iteration of one word, in 36. 38 (*ὅσ' ἐνείματο, ὅσ' εἰσεπράξατο, ὅσ' εἴληφε*), ib. 53 (the negative particle five times repeated), 37. 36. 37, 38. 28, 54. 28; of two words 27. 38 (*ταῦτ' οὐ μεγάλη καὶ περιφανὴς ἀναισχυντία; ταῦτ' οὐχ ὑπερβολὴ δεινῆς αἰσχροκερδείας;*), 30. 30, 37. 44. Examples with *μὲν—δέ* are more in number: 27. 30 (*κεκτημένον μὲν—κεκτημένον δέ*), 28. 18, 37. 44, 38. 16 (where the shift of tense shows that the speaker might have said *τότε μὲν—νῦν δέ*, and that *τοτέ* is used for the sake of the emphasis which lies in repetition), 39. 34, 41. 22, 45. 21. 42, 55. 20. 35; and with change of inflection in 36. 23 (*γεγενημένου μέν—γεγενημένης δέ*) and 45. 86 (a double instance: *δοῦλοι μὲν ἐκεῖνοι, δοῦλος δ' οὗτος ἦν, δεσπόται δ' ὑμεῖς, δεσπότης δ' ἦν ἐγώ*). Formally, of course, anaphora may be said to occur with the repetition of any word, however unimportant or inevitable; but the repetitive effect, which comes sharply and vigorously in the reiteration of the monosyllabic demonstrative, 29. 45 (compare also *τί δέ*, 39. 15), is hardly to be felt with less

[1] In the terminology I have here followed Blass, III 144–7; cf. also Rehdantz, *Neun Philipp. Red. Ind.* pp. 5–6, 12, 22, Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Rhet.* Thus (*ἐπ*)*αναδίπλωσις* is the—asyndetic—repetition of a word within the same clause, or (Dem. 28. 20) of a word which itself constitutes a clause; in (*ἐπ*)*αναφορά* two or more clauses begin, in *ἀντιστροφή* end, with the same word or words; *συμπλοκή* is the combination of these two figures, or, in substance, the repetition of a clause of several words. In *κύκλος* the second clause ends with the initial word of the first, in *ἀναστροφή* it begins with the last word of the preceding clause. The various relations might be symbolized as follows:

epanad.	a a
anaph.	a—, a—
antistr.	—b, —b
συμπλ.	a—b, a—b
κύκ.	a—, —a
anastr.	—b, b—

accumulation, such as we see in 29. 7 or 41. 11. Anaphora with three words connected by ἤ appears in 31. 13 (*πῶς ἐστι δίκαιον—ἢ π. ἐ. δ.*); and the same passage shows a somewhat irregular form with change of inflection (*ἐὰν μὲν ὀγδοήκοντα μνῶν ᾖς ὅρους, ὀγδοήκοντα μνᾶς εἶναι τὴν προῖκα*), as well as two clear-cut examples of anastrophe (*ἐὰν δὲ πλείονος πλεῖον, ἐὰν δ' ἐλάττονος ἔλαττον*), to which figure there is an approach in 31. 3 (*εἰ δικαίως—δικαίως*), and 30. 24 (*ὡς ἁπλοῖ τινες—ἁπλῶς οὐδ' ἂν μικρόν*). There is an imperfect *κύκλος* in 57. 54 (*ἦγον—ἦγον*), antistrophe in 45. 38 (*ἐπιτροπεῦσαι μὲν κατὰ διαθήκην—οὐδ' ἐπιτροπευθῆναι κατὰ διαθήκην*), ib. 82 (*εἰ μηδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἔλαττον, ἐμοῦ γ' ἔλαττον*), and in 45. 37 two fine examples noted by Blass, III 147, of *συμπλοκή*; a third, less perfect, occurs in 29. 14 (*ὡς περὶ μέν τινων σαφὴς ἡ βάσανος, περὶ δ'αὖ τινων οὐ σαφής*). In 37. 3 (*δικῶν—δίκην*) there is a rather loose application of the principle of repetition.

This figure, which conveys an effect of insistent lucidity and energy, is sufficiently well represented in the private speeches of Demosthenes to be cited as characteristic, though his use of it is, on the whole, sparing. It appears with most frequency and in greatest mass in Or. 45, but is relatively less abundant in the other speeches written for clients than in the five delivered by the orator himself, and is very weak in two of the finest orations, 39 and 54 (*κατὰ Κόνωνος*), and in one of the longest, 57 (*πρὸς Εὐβουλίδην*). In these, however, we find, with other marks of the great orator's hand, numerous examples of a still more important rhetorical figure, which has also a syntactical value, asyndeton.

Asyndeton.

This is employed by Demosthenes with no little variety of tone. It is least effective when merely explanatory, as in 57. 41 (*ὁ Πρωτόμαχος πένης ἦν*); and the weakest use of this explanatory asyndeton is found in the resumption of the speech after the introduction of documents or testimony. To the expression of feeling this construction lends great force; compare, for indignation, 29. 3, 30. 8. 24. 38, 36. 50, 37. 40, 45. 80 (two fine examples of fierce energy), 55. 25. 31, 57. 60. There is scorn in 30. 14 and 31. 8; irony in 31. 12, 36. 52, 39. 34. 36, 57. 61; pathos in 45. 85 and 57. 36. A use of the asyndeton to express haste and eagerness is found in the introduction of testimony; the command to the clerk is usually prefaced by *καί, οὖν, σὺ δέ*, but often Demosthenes says curtly *λαβέ*, or *λέγε*.

This figure acquires greater weight when it is made cumulative by the asyndetic sequence of several clauses or words. It may then convey an effect of rapidity and may be strengthened by anaphora; cf. 37. 36 (*ἂν τύφῃ τις, ἂν ὅπλ' ἐπιφέρῃ, ἂν ἐπικατατέμνῃ*), 39. 35, 57. 28, and especially the very elaborate example in 28. 20, which, in the words *ἱκετεύω ἀντιβολῶ*, shows a heightening of the force by an accumulation of words cognate in meaning, a figure which is also described as a form of epanadiplosis (Blass, III 147); cf. 36. 52 (*ἐλαύνεις διώκεις συκοφαντεῖς*), ib. 47, 39. 34. In 37. 14 vividness is thus given to the action of a third person.

Participial clauses are also found in asyndetic sequence; cf. 27. 48 (*τὴν διαθήκην ἠφανικότα, τὰ ἀνδράποδα πεπρακότα, τἄλλ' οὕτω πάντα διῳκηκότα*), where this construction, occurring at the end of a long polysyndeton, gives a strong effect of increasing warmth and vehemence, which is heightened by the hammering beat of the homioteleuton. In 29. 55–7 there is a succession of nine participial clauses without connectives; shorter complexes of like character appear in 41. 16 and 57. 56. In 41. 14 two participles are combined with an adjective, in 54. 27 with a substantival expression of time; in 54. 30 a relative clause stands between two substantives, and in 45. 36 the two participles have substantival force. Often the whole series consists of substantives, to the utterance of which this figure may lend an air of haste, as in 30. 17, 39. 9, or of serious emphasis and stress, as in 57. 24. 55, while emphasis is colored with indignation in 36. 53 and 45. 39.

Among figures of thought (*σχήματα διανοίας*) three stand out prominently in the style of Demosthenes: irony, apostrophe, and interrogation.

Irony.

The quality of his irony is vivid and cutting; cf. 28. 6, 31. 12 (*οὐ πρότερόν γ' ἢ παρὰ σοὶ, νῦν εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεις*), 36. 44 (*σὲ γὰρ ἂν πρότερον χρηστὸν ἐποίησεν εἰ ἦν ἐπ' ἐκείνῳ*); see also 30. 20, 36. 54, 37. 38, where in the sarcastic emphasis given to the opponent's name there is a concentration of the irony which suffuses the whole context of these passages. This suffusion with ironical coloring is very noticeable in Or. 39; it appears also in Or. 37 and in long episodes of Or. 36. 43–7 and 49–54. Especially to be remarked is the accumulation of sneering phrases in 36. 52, 37. 36. Sometimes again the utterance is very brief, as in the scornful *ἀλλ' οὐ δήπου ὦ Σ.*, 41. 16, and the sharp side-cut in 38. 20 (*ὁποῖοί τινές εἰσιν ἀγνῶτες*).

The temper which reveals itself in ironical utterances is visible also in other ways in Demosthenes; as in the scornful roughness of 36. 44 (*πᾶν ἂν ἀγνοήσειας*), 37. 31 (*καίτοι τίς ἂν σοὶ δραχμὴν ἔδωκε μίαν*), 45. 66 (*ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κερδαίνειν πᾶν ἂν οὗτος ποιήσειεν*), and in the paradoxical turn of 29. 13 (*σοφιστὴς καὶ σφόδρ' ἐκὼν τὰ δίκαι' ἀγνοεῖν προσποιούμενος*: repeated in a slightly different form, 30. 36), and of 45. 19 (*οὗτοι δὲ φωραθεῖεν*).

The same sense of superiority, the same air of towering above the adversary, is manifested in the rebukes which Demosthenes sometimes administers. Compare the tone of 28. 9 (*ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη μεγάλη κ. τ. ἑ.*), and of 38. 27 (*ἐπ' ἐκείνοις ἐκλάεσ' ἂν οἷς ἐποιεῖτε δικαίως*); compare Or. 39 *passim*, and especially the mingled irony and rebuke of the passage beginning *ἀλλ' ὦ χαλεπώτατε Βοιωτέ*, 34; finally much of the passionate arraignment in Orr. 36 and 45. A similar feeling finds expression befitting the youth of the speaker in 54. 23. 34. 40, and in the naïve irony of 55. 18 (*οὐ γὰρ ἐκπιεῖν γε δήπου κ. τ. λ.*).

It is to be remarked that in Demosthenes apostrophe is often tinged more or less deeply with irony; many of the passages cited above are apostrophic in form. Further, what is important to recall, this *σχῆμα* of the rhetoricians is in truth a *ἕξις*, a mental habit, and, like all innate tendencies, would be prone to emerge whenever occasion permitted, while to minds not thus endowed by nature it would be less attainable than the more mechanical among the figures of thought. And as Demosthenes would, where he could, give free play to this quality of his mind, so, where he was obliged to hold it in check, we may yet expect to see it revealed by brief flashes, little darting tongues of ironic fire. This is what happens in Or. 57, and it seems to me one of the most satisfactory guarantees for the authenticity of that speech. A. Schäfer's doubts concerning it arise from the freedom and boldness with which Euxitheus, a man of inferior position, confronts his powerful enemy, Eubulides; but the Athenians prided themselves on their *παρρησία*, and it was essential to the completeness of his defense that the speaker should expose the character and motives of his accusers. Accordingly he is bold and downright in asserting those facts which he can prove to their discredit, as in stating the proofs of his own citizenship; but the consciousness of his weakness in the face of this "gang" (*οἱ τούτῳ συνεστῶτες*, §13, cf. §10 and §16), and the circumstances of the time,

inspire a nervous anxiety, which is easily felt in the lengthy and generalizing prooemium, in the eager pathos of the conclusion, in the appealing humility of §36 (*μηδαμῶς ὦ ἄ. δ. κ. τ. ἐ.*) and §45 (*καὶ γὰρ εἰ ταπεινὸν κ. τ. λ.*), in the resigned tone of §33 (*ἀλλὰ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.*) and of §66 *init.* This nervousness tempers the boldness and causes a certain indirectness of speech in attack; cf. §7 (*τις —καταστασιασθείς*), and the vague form given to the accusation of sycophancy in §§32, 34, 49. It is true that the first of these slurs is followed by a more direct denunciation (*ἐπεὶ—διαβάλλεις*); but the speaker at once checks himself and falls back on insinuation (*ἆ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἴστε κ. τ. λ.*). The same fear of venturing too far appears in the fleeting shade of irony conveyed by the repetition of the proper name, §15–16; and the more vigorous sneer in §5 (*καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ προσῆκεν*) is yet very brief. A comparison of this speech with the first against Stephanus or with the defense of Phormio shows the full extent of the reserve which has, however, not prevented the orator from bringing out clearly much that is damaging to the accuser. It is the ironic tendency controlled by an admirable art which produces this subtle blending of frank vigor with tremulous slyness; and here, as elsewhere, we feel the *ἠθοποιία* which, with Demosthenes, consists not in descending to his client's level, but in raising the latter to his own height; he dignifies the lowly Euxitheus, as he lends grace to the rusticity of the opponent of Callicles and loftiness to the rage of Apollodorus.[1]

Apostrophe and interrogation are figures at any orator's command; and while their absence from a speech has a certain significance, the effect of their presence depends on the tone imparted to them by their position and by the feeling which they convey.

Apostrophe.

In the use of apostrophe—a term meant here to include only the act of turning from the judges to address the adversary—the fourteen speeches exhibit great variety. There is no example of this figure in Orr. 27 and 30; only one, and that very brief in Or. 54; while it abounds in Orr. 36, 37, 39 and 45, and is not infrequent in the remaining speeches. Sometimes it occupies passages of considerable length, as in 28. 7–10, 36. 43–54,

[1] Other examples of irony or superiority of tone in 27. 22, 28. 7, 29. 14, 31. 10. 12 *fin.*, 36. 21. 34, 37. 34. 54, 39. 13, 38. 16. 26, 41. 20. 24, 45. 26. 30. 50, 54. 41 *fin.*

45. 78–80; sometimes is confined to a brief phrase or two, as in 31. 12, 41. 26, 45. 84, 57. 31. The apostrophe is essentially passionate in tone, and is therefore in general not used by Demosthenes as a mere vehicle of argument; the exceptions are susceptible of explanation on artistic grounds. So in certain rapid and brief passages (36. 10. 19. 22, 39. 24, 41. 26) the personality gives a sharper point to the argument, an effect which depends on the very brevity; the incontrovertible statement is like a defiance flung at the adversary.[1] In 39. 28 we have a passage which may be explained by the influence of the dramatization in *τί—ὄνομα*; having fallen thus into direct address, the orator continues it to the end of the short argument. Or. 31 (the second against Onetor), a very short and very passionate speech, closes in mingled apostrophe and interrogation; it would seem as if the reduction of these emotional figures to an argumentative and expostulatory tone were the only way in which the orator, with little space at his command, could pass from the vehement fierceness of *ἔπειτα τὸ δεινότατον* and the sharp questions following it into the quieter and more dignified manner better suited for the delivery of the final words. In Or. 55 (*πρὸς Καλλικλέα*) also the apostrophe, in §5–7 and §29, is infused with expostulation; that is a part of the *ἠθοποιία* of the speech, and contributes to the impression of youthful candor and honest simplicity which the speaker makes upon us. But a dominance of the argumentative quality is, on the whole, unusual with Demosthenes; more characteristic are the sudden and brief turns on the adversary of which, among the speeches exhibiting this figure, Or. 28 alone furnishes no example.[2]

Interrogation.

The question also must be considered with reference to the varying degrees of force involved in it; its primary effect in style is to express the irruption of feeling, and in judging a particular

[1] There is a very beautiful instance of this in 36. 20–1; the argument is first hurled at Apollodorus in the form of a challenge (*ἐκ ποίων—ἐλάγχανες*;), and is afterwards repeated in a form which, though still aggressive, is brought nearer to the argumentative tone by the use of the third person and by the preceding conditional clause.

[2] Other examples of apostrophe occur in 29. 36–7. 41. 42, 31. 6–8. 13–14, 36. 20. 30–32. 39, 37. 26. 29. 30–31. 36. 49–50. 54. 55. 57, 38. 16. 18. 23. 24. 27, 39. 8. 9. 10. 21. 24. 26. 28. 30–32. 33–36, 41. 16. 17. 18, 45. 38. 69–70. 81. 82. 84, 54. 40, 57 31. 32.

style we have to ask what is the range of the feeling so expressed. For this purpose some sort of classification seems necessary, not like that quoted from Tiberius by Rehdantz, *Index*, *s. v. Frage*, which looks only at the speaker's object in employing the form of interrogation, but one which shall regard the content of each question apart from its rhetorical form. Arranging on this principle the interrogative phrases in the genuine private speeches and omitting such rare phenomena as the imperative and dubitative questions, I find that in each instance one or the other of the following five elements markedly predominates: 1) argument; 2) appeal; 3) assertion; 4) challenge; 5) suggestion.

Of these conceptions the first, which is unemotional, is hardest to discover in Demosthenes; most of the examples which one attempts to get for it melt away and dissolve themselves into assertion, appeal, or challenge. That is to say, even when the question is intended as an argument, the liveliness of tone which accompanies it causes it to be felt as something more emphatic. Compare, however, the close of Or. 31, already cited for the apostrophe; the explanation given for the argumentative use of that figure applies also to the interrogation which is combined with it; compare also 36. 11 (*καίτοι εἰ ἦν ἰδία τις ἀφορμὴ τουτῳὶ πρὸς τῇ τραπέζῃ, τί δή ποτ' ἂν εἵλετο τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἢ κείνην;*). It is indeed in hypothetical sentences having a question as one of their members that Demosthenes approaches nearest to the tone of simple argument; but if we contrast the passage just quoted with 29. 20 (*καίτοι εἰ γ'ἦν δοῦλος—τί μαθὼν ἐμαρτύρησεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξωμόσας ἀπηλλάγη τοῦ πράγματος;*), we see how the hypothetical form modifies the vehemence of the interrogative expression, which, with the omission of *ἄν*, springs back to its natural attitude of aggressive force.

Appeal, whether pathetic or indignant, is very common; under this head may be included especially sentences beginning with *εἶτα* or *ἆρα*. Cf. 28. 18 (*ἆρ' οὐ μεγάλα—βλάπτομαι;*); 36. 56, 45. 70 (*εἶθ' ὃν ὁρᾶτ' — οὐ τιμωρήσεσθε;*), 54. 20; also those in which a verb of thinking, or a corresponding expression, makes an appeal to the opinion of the judges, as in 30. 20 (*καίτοι τῷ τοῦθ' ὑμῶν πιστόν;*), 57. 26 (*οἴεταί τις ἂν κ. τ. λ.*); and finally the simple exclamation seen in 30. 36 (*τούτου γένοιτ' ἄν τις σχετλιώτερος ἄνθρωπος;*), 27. 28 (*τί οὖν—δόξει;*).

The assertive question comprises notably the numerous sentences which begin with *πῶς* or *πῶς οὐ*. Thus, in 29. 55, the

demand, *πῶς ἂν δύναιτό τις σαφέστερον ἐξελέγξαι*, is only a rhetorical mode of saying *οὐκ ἂν δύναιτό τις σαφ. ἐξ.*; and in 30. 18 the expression, *πῶς οὐ φανερὸν ὅτι—ζητοῦσιν*, differs only rhetorically from the *δῆλον μὲν τοίνυν—ὅτι—τολμῶσι πράττειν* in the same paragraph. Compare also, in 38. 24, the parenthetic *πῶς γάρ* following on *ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἴσον*. The same value belongs also to many of the questions introduced by an interrogative pronoun; cf. 36. 44 (*ἀλλ' οἶμαι τῆς σῆς ἀπληστίας—τίς ἂν δύναιτ' ἐφικέσθαι = οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναιτ' ἐφικέσθαι*), 41. 7 (*τί ἂν ἔτι μεῖζον κ. τ. λ.*), 45. 41 (*τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἄφρων κ. τ. λ.*).

The tone of the challenge is easily felt; the speaker seems to demand an answer to his question and at the same time to be confident that no answer is possible; cf. 29. 41 (*τίνι τῶν ψευδομαρτυριῶν ἐπεσκήψω; δεῖξον. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις δεῖξαι*); 37. 26 (*τί γὰρ, εἰ κατέστησεν Εὔεργος, ἐγώ σ' ἀδικῶ*;), where the vivid and brief apostrophic interrogation turns the argument into a defiance; 41. 22 (*τί δή ποτ'—αὐτῶν*;), 57. 55 (*εἶτ' ἐγὼ ξένος; ποῦ μετοίκιον καταθείς*;).

The distinction between these four classes is a subjective one, dependent on the reader's feeling; the fifth class has a formal character, which renders it unmistakable and stamps it as a thing apart from the others. We must weigh them to ascertain their value; it is a bit of current coin. This is what Tiberius calls the question *εἰς προσοχήν*, to arouse attention; and his term may be accepted if we permit ourselves to understand it not of tone, as does Rehdantz—who objects that to excite the attention of the hearer is the object of every rhetorical interrogation—but as referring to the content of the question. It suggests to the judges what the speaker is about to say and thus fixes their attention upon it; cf. 27. 38 (*νῦν δὲ τί ποιοῦσιν*;); 41. 5 (*τίνος οὖν εἵνεκ'—εἶπον*;); 37. 26 (*πῶς οὖν—γράψαι*;); 57. 15 (*τί—Εὐβουλίδῃ*;).

The suggestive question imparts liveliness to narrative; the challenge is bold and emphatic. Neither is found in all of the genuine private orations; I have noted examples of the first only in eight speeches (27. 38, 29. 8. 11. 19. 31. 33, 31. 3, 37. 26. 27. 29. 36. 37. 50, 38. 25, 39. 13. 29. 35. 37, 41. 5. 18. 20. 27, 57. 8. 15. 17. 61. 68), of the second in nine (28. 7, 29. 41. 47, 31. 9. 14, 36. 20. 31. 54, 37. 26. 28. 54. 67, 38. 11. 16, 39. 14. 21. 24. 28, 41. 17. 22, 45. 38. 84). The absence of either from a doubtful oration would therefore not seem to be in itself evidence against genuineness; but it may add greater weight to other indications of tame-

ness or lack of spirit, defects by no means Demosthenean. It is to be observed also that eleven out of the fourteen speeches exhibit one or the other of these two kinds of question, and that Or. 54, which shows only the suggestion in indirect form (§13), and Or. 55, which contains neither kind, have in common a certain modesty of tone mingled with pathetic warmth, to which the keenness of the challenge and the rather dramatic pose of the suggestion are essentially foreign.

Rhetorical Answer.

The rhetorical question may be answered rhetorically; and this answer may be put either as an expression of opinion or as an assertion of fact. So we find in 31. 5 *ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν δοκεῖ*; in 31. 11 *ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδὲν οἶμαι*, which latter phrase reappears under varying forms in ten other passages: 31. 13, 37. 37, 38. 12, 39. 24, 45. 13, 54. 20. 22. 43, 55. 13, 57. 35.[1] Corresponding affirmative expressions are *ἐγὼ οἶμαι*, 29. 34; *φήσειέ γ' ἄν τις*, 30. 30; *ἔγωγ' ἂν φαίην*, 45. 65. Or a verb of knowing may be used with a negative; compare *οὐκ οἶδα* in 27. 48 and 29. 24, and the similar use of *ἔχω* in 27. 63 and 29. 57. As a more emphatic form of reply we have *οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα*, 27. 57, 29. 49, 57. 53; *οὐκ ἔχει ταῦτ' ἀλήθειαν*, 30. 34; and the various combinations of *οὐδέ* with other words in 27. 59, 36. 19. 25, 39. 40, 45. 12, 55. 13, 57. 55. So too *οὐκ ἔνεστι δήπουθεν*, 30. 16, and the affirmative *πάνυ γε*, 39. 14. In 37. 56. 60 and 38. 22 we find what corresponds to these replies in form, but scarcely in force, an appeal expressed by *μηδαμῶς*.

The effect of these phrases is to impress the speaker's opinion or conviction upon the mind of the hearer. The same purpose is served by similar curt utterances following on a supposition, as in 36. 22 (*οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα*), 39. 20 (*οὐκ ἔγωγ' ἡγοῦμαι*), 45. 45 (*οὐ δήπου*). Oftener this form of contradiction is introduced by *ἀλλά*; cf. 29. 39 (*ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν*), ib. 41 (*ἀλλ' οὐκ ἠδικημένος συκοφαντεῖς*),

[1] 31. 5 *ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν δοκεῖ τούτου μεῖζον εὑρεθῆναι*, and 54. 22 *ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' ἀποθανόντ' οἶμαι*, show in the use of the causative particle a slight divergence from the usual asyndetic form of the rhetorical answer; and there is a more substantial difference in the fact that the words *εὑρεθῆναι* and *ἀποθανόντ'* introduce a conception not found in the preceding sentence. In the first case this is unimportant, as the verb conveys really the same idea as that expressed by *μεῖζον ἄν τι γένοιτο*; but the amplification in *ἀποθανόντ'* ought perhaps to prevent us from regarding this passage as purely rhetorical.

36. 11. 37. 37, 41. 26, 54. 41, 57. 25. 49. 51. So in 29. 59 and 41. 20 we have emphatic parentheses after a negative assertion; in 36. 54 the sentence, *οὐκ ἠδικοῦ, ἀλλ' οἶμαι συκοφαντεῖς νῦν*, follows on a question, less as an answer than as a refutation of the implied hypothesis.

As lucid argument and firm construction are among the recognized excellences of Demosthenes, it will be worth while to inquire into the mechanical means by which he achieves this clearness and solidity.

Deictic Expressions.

Two particles seem of especial importance as constructive elements: *τοίνυν*, and *οὖν* in the combination *μὲν οὖν*. Both are employed to mark the introduction of an important statement, a new incident, or a fresh link in the chain of reasoning; they serve in a formal way to call attention to what is about to be said. The attention of the hearers is also engaged and fixed upon a desired point by a free use in emphatic positions of the demonstratives *οὗτος, τοιοῦτος, τοσοῦτος, ἐκεῖνος*; and a more open demand is made upon them by the employment of verbs and verbal phrases. Thus we find, pointing forward, the futures *δείξω, διδάξω, εἴσεσθε, γνώσεσθε*; the imperatives *σκοπεῖτε, σκέψασθε, ἀκούσατε*; the phrases *δεῖ*, or *βέλτιόν ἐστι, ὑμᾶς μαθεῖν*, or *ἀκοῦσαι*; pointing backward, the perfects *ἀκηκόατε, μεμαθήκατε, μεμαρτύρηται*. There are also the expressions *δῆλόν ἐστι, φανερόν ἐστι, ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι μαθεῖν*; the introduction of testimony is often prefaced by *ὡς*, or *ὅτι, ἀληθῆ λέγω*; and in the same connection a summary of facts is often given. The variety of such phrases is scarcely indicated by those quoted; and the effect of variety is increased by the habit of employing several together; thus *ἵν' εἰδῆτε* is often followed by *ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω*, the latter often by a summary of facts. Cf. 38. 9, where we have *ὅτι μὲν οὖν . . . . ἱκανῶς πάντας ἡγοῦμαι μεμαθηκέναι, ὅτι δ' ὕστερον . . . . τοῦτο βούλομαι δεῖξαι*, with a recital of facts that have been and are to be stated. A similar arrangement is found in 54. 13; and while not all combinations are equally full, the accumulation of several deictic words or phrases is always a notable feature.

It is as important to note the limitation of such expressions as their use; both are well illustrated in Or. 27. About six-sevenths of that speech, sections 1–59, are taken up with the statement of the case; and here we find *μὲν οὖν* nine times, *τοίνυν* twenty times, some two dozen emphatic demonstratives and as many monitory

verbs. So far the movement of the speech is deliberate and regular; in spite of the outburst in §47–8 we feel that the orator has himself well in hand and is bent only on reasoning and convincing. At the beginning of §60 he reminds the judges in set phrase of what they have heard (*τοσαύτης τοίνυν οὐσίας . . . ὅσην . . . ἠκούσατε*), and then, putting aside finally all such restraints on the flood of speech, moves on to the close in a rapid torrent of crowding sentences, which breathe mingled denunciation and entreaty. And since, in this passage, we find none of the deictic utterances noted above, it becomes plain where their province lies; they belong to demonstration and are expelled by the intrusion of passion. If found in a passionate passage, they immediately give the effect of a pause, an attempt at restraint; compare, in 36. 48. 54, the evident check imposed on the current of denunciation by the clauses beginning *ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι, ἡγοῦμαι τοίνυν, τούτων τοίνυν.*

Although these particles and deictic phrases do not belong to emotional utterance, their frequency seems hardly to stand in inverse ratio to the predominance of the latter. A rough calculation as to the proportion of such expressions in each speech yields the following result:

Or.	No. of pages (Teubner).	No. of deictic expressions.	Proportion.
38	8	33	4.125
36	17½	63	3.6
27	20	68	3.4
31	4	13	3.25
30	10½	33	3.14
29	17	50	2.9
37	17	46	2.7
57	20½	53	2.59
45	25	62	2.48
41	8½	21	2.47
39	11½	26	2.26
55	9½	19	2
54	14	27	1.9
28	7	12	1.7

This would seem to indicate a relation between these phrases and the predominance or subordination of the legal element in a speech; for we find at the head of the list Or. 38 (*πρὸς Ναυσίμαχον καὶ Ξενοπείθην*), which deals chiefly with a point of law, Or. 36 (*ὑπὲρ*

Φορμίωνος), delivered by an advocate, and the lawyer-like speeches of Demosthenes himself; near the foot the two orations, 54 and 55, especially marked by *naïveté* and simplicity of tone, one, 39, which turns on no point of law, and one, 41, the speaker of which announces himself as a quiet citizen, unaccustomed to the courts; as for Or. 45, far more of its considerable length is devoted to vilification than to argument. One indeed of the speeches delivered by the author, 28 (*κατὰ Ἀφόβου β'*), stands last on the list, and it is interesting to observe the difference between this and 31, both being epilogues and both full of warmth and vehemence. Each begins with an argument; but the former passes into summary and appeal, the latter continues with argumentative criticism of the adversary's pleas. That is to say, Demosthenes, however moved by passion, would not argue without the help of the formulas which made for lucidity, while in the recital of matters already familiar to the hearers he abandoned himself to the least impeded flow of rapid utterance; on the other hand we see the influence of *ἠθοποιία* and the sensitiveness of the artist in the degree to which this born reasoner subdued his tendency to emphatic and pointed demonstration when writing for such personages as Ariston (in the speech against Conon), or for the unnamed adversaries of Spudias and Callicles.

Transitions.

This love of clearness is especially observable in the careful deliberateness with which the orator passes from one to another of the main divisions of a speech. The transition from prooemium to narrative was hardly neglected even by inferior writers, since the prooemium itself had a certain fixity of form,[1] but that from narrative to argument, or any shift of topic, is, with Demosthenes, habitually marked and emphasized. Compare 27. 7, where the passage from the statement of the case to that concerning the amount of the property is elaborately defined: *καὶ τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον . . . τοῦτ' ἦν . . . τὸ δὲ πλῆθος . . . ὅτι τοῦτ' ἦν κ. τ. λ.* Compare also the introduction of the argument in 29. 10, 45. 7, 57. 17; the closing of the narrative in 30. 9, 36. 18, 37. 17; the elaborate transition from narrative to criticism of the adversary's defense in 54. 13. Such passages, which stand out like seams in the oratorical web, at once

[1] Though, as will be seen later, the difference in tone at this point sometimes serves to distinguish the greater from the lesser artist.

linking and defining its different sections, are too obvious to call for much comment; some curious exceptions in Or. 38 deserve more notice. The formal prooemium of that speech seems to end with the words *βοηθῆσαί μοι τὰ δίκαια*, found also in other prooemia (27. 3, 45. 2, 54, 2), but there followed by some deictic phrase introductory of the narrative. Here, on the contrary, there follows, as if in parenthesis, a sentence, explanatory of the words *μὴ προσήκοντος ἐγκλήματος*, which would naturally be placed within the prooemium, as would also the next sentence, *τὴν μὲν οὖν . . . εἴσεσθε*. That they are really beyond its limits, or, if we like, that it has no definite limit, appears from the immediate introduction of the testimony on which the opening argument is to be based, and which takes the place of a *διήγησις*; after having thus stated his case vicariously, the speaker proceeds to that discussion of the demurrer, which is the real body and substance of the speech, and this he prefaces by a series of deictic phrases which, in their nearness to the incomplete prooemium, seem to stand for its formal conclusion. In fact the prooemium is constructed with exceeding looseness, and the *διήγησις* is, so to speak, telescoped into it. Looking further at the singularly abrupt introduction of new arguments in §23 (*οὐκ ἐμίσθωσαν κ. τ. λ.*), and at the "purple patch" in §21–22, which overweights the short speech and is less fitly placed than as epilogue to Or. 37 (*πρὸς Πανταίνετον*), we may conjecture that, in handling this slight case, Demosthenes saved time and trouble by declining the labor of careful construction. The imperfections furnish, however, no good reason for doubting the genuineness of the oration, which not only has many Demosthenic features, but is, even in its scamped state, notably lucid and effective, and is not to be called inartistic, but rather the unfinished product of a manifest artist.

Prooemia.

Such careless dealing with the prooemium is the more noticeable, because some of the speeches show in precisely this part a remarkable subtlety and delicacy of finish. In the earliest orations, indeed, the introduction has only the excellence of a severe correctness; that of Or. 27 is a simple *captatio benevolentiae*, that of Or. 30 a *conflatio invidiae*, while these elements are mingled in Or. 29; in the two latter a statement of the points at issue is added (29. 5, 30. 4–5). But in turning to the prooemium of 36 we find

ourselves in contact with a much finer and more original piece of workmanship. This compact little masterpiece fulfills indeed all conventional purposes by exciting good-will for one party, prejudice against the other, and defining the points to be proved; but there is no conventionality in the exquisitely felicitous phrasing and the effect produced may be compared to that of an operatic overture, which does not merely preface the following composition, but indicates its tone and character. The simple gravity of the opening words foreshadows the fine impersonal dignity which the advocate maintains throughout; the warmth and rapidity of the sentence *ὅσα γὰρ συκοφαντεῖ*, with its unusual and startling anacoluthon, breathes the spirit of all that ardent vituperation and laudation to which so much of the speech is devoted; and the final sentence, *ἐξ ἀρχῆς—ἀκούσαντες*, while constituting the formal transition to the narrative, sums up with noteworthy sharpness and emphatic brevity the whole purpose of the speech in the mention of the two main topics—the point of law (*ὡς οὐκ εἰσαγώγιμος ἡ δίκη*) and the rascality of Apollodorus (*τὴν τούτου συκοφαντίαν*). A minor delicacy of more mechanical sort, but important for purposes of comparison, lies in the fact that stress is laid on the object of the demurrer (*τὴν μὲν οὖν—κυρία*), while the grounds on which it is based are only incidentally touched upon. So in Or. 37 the speaker makes only an allusion to the *ἄφεσις καὶ ἀπαλλαγή*; he first suggests the character of his defense, which will rest on his own innocence (*οὐδὲν ἠδίκηκα τοῦτον*) and on the illegality of the action (*παρὰ τὸν νόμον κ. τ. ἑ.*), and then foreshadows its spirit by a vigorous and cutting denunciation of the audacity of Pantaenetus (2 *εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπεπόνθει κ. τ. ἑ.*; *οὐδὲν ἠδικημένος . . . . συκοφαντεῖ*; 3 *πολλῶν . . . . τετόλμηκεν*). This introduction, while stamped with the same character of suggestiveness that belongs to that of 36, is much inferior to it in comprehensiveness and neatness; admirable, on the other hand, is the very brief and closely woven prooemium of Or. 45.[1] The suit, brought against Stephanus for perjury, is meant as an attack on Phormio, and the first words betoken its double nature: *καταψευδομαρτυρηθείς*—he does not think it worth

[1] I do not wish to seem unduly to depreciate the admirable prooemium of Or. 37, which, in its loftiness of tone and largeness of outline, well balances the magnificent epilogue of the same speech, but lacks the peculiar preluding quality and the brilliant condensation to which I desire to call attention.

while to say by whom, but hurries on to the real author of the false testimony—*καὶ παθὼν ὑπὸ Φορμίωνος ὑβριστικὰ καὶ δεινά*; and at the end he repeats this double charge in chiastic form (*τήν τ' ἐκείνου πονηρίαν . . . καὶ τούτους ὅτι τὰ ψευδῆ μεμαρτυρήκασι*); while between comes a touch of Apollodorean plaintiveness (*μέγα γὰρ τοῖς ἠτυχηκόσιν κ. τ. ἑ.*, cf. §§57, 85), and then a summary of the three main points in the denunciation of Stephanus—that he has perjured himself, and that for money, and stands self-convicted; this put with the most vigorous bare curtness in swift participial construction and clinched with an asyndetic phrase which is rendered doubly emphatic by its unusual position in the very beginning of the speech. A similar initial sharpness of suggestion appears in the first word of Or. 54, *ὑβρισθείς*; for the plaintiff, who brings a charge only of *αἰκία*, regards Conon as guilty of *ὕβρις*, and this conception he enforces upon the judges from the start, and justifies by the words immediately following, *καὶ παθὼν . . . περιφεύξεσθαί με*, which are significant in their simplicity; they tell nothing of the manner of the offense, which is here immaterial, but reveal in full its consequences to serve as pendant and righteous apology to the utterance *ἥδιστ' ἂν θανάτου κρίνας τοῦτον*. Here the note is struck which is to dominate the whole; so, too, in 55. 1, where the plaintive reflection, *οὐκ ἦν . . . τυχεῖν*, harmonizes with the naïve and expostulatory tone of the speech, and at the same time gives with refreshing novelty of form the common disclaimer of litigiousness. Then follows a brief recital of facts to support the accusation contained in the words *πονηροῦ καὶ πλεονέκτου*; and the transition to the narrative is made by an appeal which reflects the diffident modesty of the speaker in the words *οὐχ—εἰπεῖν*, and his strong sense of injury in the final, and therefore more emphatic, *φανερῶς συκοφαντοῦμαι*.

In the rough-hewn prooemium of 38, the only point to be especially noted is, that here, as in 36 and 37, the argument on the *παραγραφή* is not anticipated. That of 41 has a touch of suggestive quality in the opening words (*ἀδελφὰς ἔχομεν ὦ ἄ. δ. γυναῖκας κ. τ. ἑ.*), which establish a reason for the reserve that characterizes the speaker's language, while the quiet simplicity of the whole passage agrees with the unemphatic tone of the short speech; thus the concluding words of the prologue (*ὅμως κ. τ. ἑ.*) and those of the epilogue (§30 *fin.*) are alike singularly untinged with the pathos habitual in such appeals. In the prooemium of

39 a narrative is smoothly interwoven with the *deprecatio invidiae* which constitutes its essential purport (cf. §1 *οὐδεμιᾷ φιλοπραγμοσύνῃ*; §6, *οὐχ οὕτω σκαιός*); this exceptional arrangement is both logical and artistically effective, inasmuch as the events narrated, while yielding excellent ground for the assertion that the plaintiff is not actuated by a spirit of mere perversity, do not form the subject of the argumentation, that is, do not correspond to a real *διήγησις* in the strict sense of that term. The character of the whole is slightly foreshadowed in the absence of comment on the methods by which the adoption was brought about, in the stress laid on the speaker's fulfilment of all legal claims (§6 *τὸ τρίτον νείμασθαι μέρος*), and in the cumulative asyndeton in §4 (*εἰσήγαγ', ἐποιήσατο . . . ἐγγράφει*), a figure especially frequent in this speech and here affording a brief hint of the rapidity and warmth which are to prevail throughout. Finally, the unusually long prooemium of 57 is the speech in miniature, a pathetic and anxious appeal with flashes of vehemence cautiously restrained; anticipatory of the whole in manner, not in matter, since here the appeal is based on general considerations proper to the partly public sphere of the case.

II.—Comparison with Lysias and Isaeus.

It need hardly be said that none of the figures or phrases which have been reviewed is, any more than the prooemium itself, the exclusive property of Demosthenes; it is only the manner of handling the common material that reveals the orator's temperament and artistic power. A brief comparison with the usages of his two chief predecessors in forensic oratory, Lysias and Isaeus, may enable us more clearly to define his individuality and more easily to discover or deny its presence in compositions of doubtful authorship. In studying Lysias I have left out of consideration not only the orations marked as spurious by Scheibe (2, 6, 15, 20), but also Orr. 8, 11, 33, and 34. The first and third of these are epideictic; the second is, as Scheibe remarks, an epitome of 10; the last is a mere fragment. This is true indeed of several speeches included in my study, but they at least belong to the judicial sphere, while the speech on the constitution is deliberative. The comparison with Lysias is in any case less exact than that with Isaeus, as only a few of the former's extant speeches (10, 17, 23, 32) belong to the class of *ἰδιωτικοί*.

Denunciation.

The denunciatory epithets employed not infrequently by Isaeus have much the same range and tone as the Demosthenean: *ἀναίσχυντος, -ία, -εῖν*, 1. 8. 26. 47, 3. 35. 40. 72, 6. 54, 8. 13. 40, 11. 14; *ἀναιδής, -εια*, 1. 2. 7, 2. 28, 3. 18. 67, 4. 19, 6. 13. 43. 46, 7. 21. 23, 11. 6; *πονηρός, -ία* 3. 39. 40, 5. 13. 35, 6. 55, 11. 20; *αἰσχροκέρδεια* 1. 8; *μιαρία* 5. 11; *ἀδικία* 5. 31; *πλεονεξία* 8. 2, 11. 36; *ἀνόσιος* 4. 19; *σχέτλιος* 11. 6; under the same head may be brought *φιλοχρηματεῖν* 10. 17. Words of this class are wanting in Or. 12, a fragment devoid of all rhetorical coloring, and in Or. 9, where their absence might be attributed to *ἠθοποιία*, if the sympathetic plasticity which this word implies could be otherwise discovered in the somewhat uniform and rigid style of Isaeus. He may in this case have exercised a reserve imposed by the position or character of his client, but the latter's personality is not otherwise felt, and the absence of vituperation fails therefore to have, as with Demosthenes, a distinct stylistic effect.[1] The sphere of the Lysianic speeches seems in general to render a detailed comparison on this point superfluous; in those which enter into consideration we find *κακία* §10. 28, *ἀναισχυντία* §32. 20, *πονηρία* ib. §23. In Or. 3, which Dionysius compares with the speech against Conon (Dem. 54), *πονηρία* occurs twice, §9. 44, in neither case with strong emphasis; *πανοῦργος* ib. 44 is quite indirect.

Deictic Expressions.

Of deictic words and phrases, which are frequent in both orators, little need be said; their proportion seems to be highest in Demosthenes, lowest in Isaeus, and to vary most in the different speeches of Lysias. The ratio of *τοίνυν* to *μὲν οὖν* is much higher in Demosthenes than in his two predecessors, the figures being:

	Lys.	Isae.	Dem.
τοίνυν	121 = .6	77 = .66	180 = .83
μὲν οὖν	80 = .4	40 = .34	36 = .17

[1] The remarks of Moy, *Plaidoyers d'Isée* VIII, do not tell against this view. It is true that Isaeus does not "make little fishes talk like whales"; but the subtle reflection of another's character in his own style, the high dramatic perfection of *ἠθοποιία* achieved by Demosthenes and by Lysias, were beyond his reach.

Apostrophe.

Lysias uses apostrophe in a few orations with telling effect; cf. 10. 8–10. 12–14. 16. 17. 18, 13. 48. 58–9. 61. 75. 87, 30. 5. 17. 19; also 26. 1, where the mutilation of the speech leaves the precise force of the apostrophe uncertain. It is to be observed that, in the first examples cited from 10, the apostrophe, while externally argumentative, becomes ironical through the fact that the argument turns on a hypothetical instance of the cowardice with which the adversary is slyly taunted throughout. In 7. 20–22 the figure is argumentative and expostulatory, as in Dem. 55, and with the same justification. That Lysias should have used so rarely a form of speech, the capabilities of which he so well understood, may doubtless be explained in large part from the circumstances attending each particular oration; but it must also be borne in mind that the apostrophe is essentially and pre-eminently aggressive, while persuasiveness is the dominant quality in the graceful eloquence of Lysias. Isaeus employs this figure only in four of his twelve speeches. The long apostrophic denunciation in 5.43–7 recalls some passages in Dem. 36 and 45, but is artistically less satisfactory because carried to the end of the speech, instead of being relieved by a final address to the judges. The sharp, brief turn in 6. 54 is quite Demosthenic; and the expostulation with the witness (who is an uncle of the speaker) in 9. 23 exhibits an effective use of the apostrophe of a kind not to be paralleled from Demosthenes or Lysias. The remaining passages (3. 40–41. 45–6. 48–9, 6. 25–6) show a decided weakness of treatment; apostrophe and interrogation combined are made, what Demosthenes rarely permits either to become, the vehicle of argument. This is comprehensible enough in a writer whose strength lay in argumentation, and who evidently possessed rather a technical command of tropes than a natural or artistic leaning toward tropical expression; but it helps to mark the far lower level of art on which this trained advocate stood as compared with the literary craftsman who preceded, or with the great statesman who followed, him.

Interrogation.

Interrogation occurs in most of the Lysianic orations (not in 5, 17, 23, 28) and abounds in the Isaean; but the two livelier forms, the challenge and the suggestion, are infrequent with both writers. Lysias has two examples of each in two speeches: the challenge

in 4. 5. 19, the suggestion in 13. 20. 64. These turns of speech have an abrupt resilient quality that does not perfectly accord with the continuous, easy flow of his style; and we may account in like manner for the fact that the rhetorical answer, which he employs rather more frequently, exhibits only in two instances the asyndetic form preferred by Demosthenes; so 13. 74, 31. 28; with *γάρ* 3. 36, 4. 7. 19, 26. 7; with *ἀλλά* 4. 5, 19. 38–9. The failure of Isaeus to employ the challenge (found only in 5. 43) may be ascribed to the unimaginative and essentially argumentative nature of his oratory, which does not easily rise to dramatic effects; it is more surprising to find the suggestive question only in four speeches (5. 13, 6. 36. 63, 8. 9, 11. 11. 32. 34). No doubt, the very vividness of this figure prevented him from using it more lavishly; his close, coherent style holds, but does not arrest, the attention. Of the rhetorical answer, on the other hand, which is simply a form of emphasis, Isaeus furnishes not a few examples, usually in asyndeton (1. 29, 2. 22. 39, 3. 25. 34. 37. 39. 48. 49. 51. 66, 7. 32, 8. 11. 28, 9. 31, 10. 17, 11. 12. 19. 26); it is curious to observe how many of these occur in Or. 3 and with what similarity of phrasing; thus §25. 39. 49 *ναὶ μὰ Δία, εἰ ἦν ἀληθὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα*; §48 *νὴ Δί' εἰ ἦν ἀληθῆ*; §34, *πολύ γε μάλιστ' ἄν, εἰ ἦν ἀληθὲς τὸ πρᾶγμα.*

Irony.

Irony is not a habit with Isaeus; the sharp utterances in 5. 40 (*τὴν οὐσίαν, ἐφ' ᾗ νῦν ἐστι λαμπρός, ἀλλοτρίαν*) and 11. 4 (*ἐπειδὴ δεινὸς εἶ διαβάλλειν καὶ τοὺς νόμους διαστρέφειν*) are isolated instances of a really vigorous use of this figure. A few fainter touches occur in 2. 21 (*τοῦ φάσκοντος εὖ φρονεῖν*), 3. 29 (*δοκεῖ ἂν ὑμῖν κ. τ. ἑ.*), ib. 70 (*ὦ 'γαθέ*); in 5. 1 the repetition of the proper name conveys not sarcasm, but reprobation. Lysias, with his lively, flexible intellect, has a larger command of ironical expression; but the Lysianic irony is neither as constant as the Demosthenic, nor has it equal range or weight. One speech indeed (10, *κατὰ Θεομνήστου ἀ*) is conceived almost throughout in this spirit; the defendant had before been accused of cowardice in battle, and around this charge the speaker plays with clever insinuation; especially neat are the turns in §11 (*μεμελέτηκας—λέγειν*; *ἐξήρκει—τὴν ἀσπίδα*), §22 (*αὐτὸς δὲ σώσας τὴν ἀσπίδα*), §23 (*ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀποβεβληκὼς τὰ ὅπλα*). The words *φαῦλον γὰρ—ἡγούμην* in §2 have an ingenious doubleness

of meaning; they may signify either the contemptible nature of such an imputation or the slight value to be set on such a life as that of the father of Theomnestus, and the latter sense is brought out by the praise of the speaker's own father in §3 (*οὕτω πολλοῦ ἀξίου*). At other moments the character attributed to Theomnestus stirs the accuser into frank indignation (§13–14, 28–9); just as the tone of sarcastic *bonhomie* in §11 (*οὗτος δέ μοι δοκεῖ κ. τ. ἑ.*), and in the explanation of the legal phraseology §16, 17, 18, varies with that of indignant superiority in §20 (*σιδηροῦς—δηλώσει δέ*) and §23 (*οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸς ἀξιώσειεν*); but the general impression is one of feline mischievousness, and we feel that the taunts under which Theomnestus may have winced must have provoked laughter from the judges. The paradox in §26 (*ἀκούσαντα κακῶς τὰ προσήκοντα*) is very neat in its brevity and shows a characteristic lightness of touch; cf. 7. 23 (*οὐ γὰρ—μαρτύρων*), 12. 27 (*οὐ γὰρ—ἐλάμβανον*), 32. 22 (*γράμματα—ἀντὶ χρημάτων*). In 12. 7 (*ἀποκτιννύναι—ἐποιοῦντο*) the collocation of ideas, in 12. 86 (*ἐβουλόμην—ἀπολλύναι*) the contrast, yields an ironic flavor; in 30. 17 the brief apostrophe and rapid return to the judges impart a sarcastic coloring to the argument. Coarser and more obvious are the brief sneers in 24. 3 (*τί τούτου διοίσω*), ib. 21 (*τῶν ὁμοίως τούτῳ φαύλων*), ib. 27 (*τῶν ὁμοίων αὐτῷ*) and the sarcasms in 13. 44 (*ἵν' εἰδῆτε κ. τ. ἑ.*), 30. 7 (*τούτων—λοιδοροῦσιν*). There is a curious obscurity in 12. 63 (*καίτοι σφόδρ' ἂν κ. τ. ἑ.*); and this, like the extreme brevity of the implication ib. 7 (where the one word *μετοίκοις* involves the idea of the citizens and the wrongs done to them by Eratosthenes), is akin to an allusive tendency which appears, apart from irony, in some Lysianic passages, as 9. 5 (*λέγοντες—ἐνδημοίη*), 10. 24 (*τίς ἂν οὐκ ἐλεήσειε Διονύσιον*); and so the indirectness of 16. 19 (*πολλοὶ—εἰργασμένοι*) is to be contrasted with the distinctness of Dem. 37. 52 and 45. 77, where the speakers are made to dwell more frankly on their personal disadvantages. No doubt, Lysias could count on being understood; but this very inclination to rely on the comprehension of his hearers recalls the fact that he trained himself in writing not for the public, but for a small circle of admirers, such as Plato's *Phaedrus* shows gathered about him, while the insistent clearness of Isaeus and Demosthenes suggests the larger and more varied audience of the law courts. It is in part this divergence in their early surroundings that explains for us the difference between the irony of Lysias and that of

Demosthenes; the former was accustomed to amuse and delight applauding friends by easy insinuating dexterities of speech; for the latter, reared in an atmosphere of combat, the most finished utterance was never without a certain grim earnestness of intention. Of course, character must also be taken into account, and here the element of ἠθοποιία, as exhibited in each orator, comes into consideration. Even when he wrote for others to speak, the language of Demosthenes was necessarily ironical, lofty, incisive; his powerful nature absorbed and transmuted the personality with which it had to become identified. Lysias exhibits greater diversities of tone and attitude; like irony, other qualities, found in one oration, are absent from another, and sometimes his compositions rise above mediocrity by talent only, not by force of character; the plasticity of his nature expressed itself in his clinging style, that rarest of styles, which, like an elastic and transparent mask, reveals indifferently the native features, or the grimaces, of all who borrow it, from the pensioner to the patriot.

Repetition.

In dealing with repetition in Isaeus and Lysias it is necessary to distinguish the rhetorical figure from a mere reiteration without rhetorical effect. This last is, as Blass observes (II 502), a tendency with the former orator; cf. 6. 50, where the words εἰσὶ γνήσιοι are twice repeated with a certain awkwardness of distinctness. In Lysias this apparently artless reiteration appears a part of that studied simplicity on which Dionysius remarks (*de Lys.* 8); so in 1. 17 (πάντα μου—ὑποψίας). In a comparison intended to show the artistic use of the figure in the three orators it seems reasonable to set aside not only such cases, but also those in which a word used in anaphora is inevitable and therefore unemphatic, as is the case with ὅσα, Dem. 36. 38, and ἄν, Dem. 37. 36. 37, and to confine ourselves to the most regular or most emphatic forms. Of these Lysias has four: anaphora with μὲν—δέ (7. 41, 10. 27, 12. 19. 21. 76. 77. 78. 94, 13. 1. 44, 16. 8, 18. 3, 19. 9. 62, 21. 25, 23. 11), asyndetic anaphora (3. 46, 14. 6), epanadiplosis (13. 93, 31. 22), κύκλος (4. 16). Isaeus exhibits a greater variety; anaphora with μὲν—δέ (5. 9. 20, 6. 43, 11. 9. 10), asyndetic anaphora (8. 14, 11. 6. 35), epanadiplosis (11. 35 *bis*), συμπλοκή (5. 25, 6. 53), κύκλος (5. 46), anastrophe (8. 17). The number of occurrences and proportion per Teubner page for the three orators are:

	Lys.	Isae.	Dem.
anaphora with *μὲν—δέ*:	16	5	12
asyndetic anaphora:	2	3	6
epanadiplosis:	2	2	·7
συμπλοκή:	...	2	3
κύκλος:	1	1	1
anastrophe:	...	1	4
antistrophe:	...	...	2
	21 = .114	14 = .101	35 = .185

Of the Lysianic instances four-fifths belong to the first class, the weakest and least rhetorical of all; and it is noticeable that in his two cases of epanadiplosis the natural sharpness of the figure is softened by the wide interval at which the word is repeated—an effect found also in §13 of the speech against Conon, which approaches nearer to the Lysianic style than any other Demosthenic oration except that against Callicles. And if Demosthenes uses stronger repetitions than does Lysias, he employs these strong forms with more variety and force than does Isaeus. His *συμπλοκή* is more massive; his asyndetic anaphora is often combined with interrogation; and his language is sometimes colored by a warmth of feeling which lends greater weight to repetition. This is noticeably the case in 28. 20, where the epanadiplosis marks the rise of passion and is followed by a wonderful series of short asyndetic clauses, two of which, *σώσατ' ἐλεήσατε* and *ἱκετεύω ἀντιβολῶ*, represent a variant form of epanadiplosis. Moreover, the habitual care with which Demosthenes varied his phrase, avoiding alike the naïve iterations of Lysias and the loose usage of Isaeus, throws into relief the distinct rhetorical purpose of his repetitions; they acquire artistic finish and significance from their setting, no less than from their form. It is difficult to attribute to Lysias any lack of artistic power; and an example of asyndetic anaphora not cited above (32. 16) shows how well he understood its value for the expression of feeling. But that vehement sentence is not an integral part of the oration in which it occurs; it is quoted, or rather professes to be quoted, from the excited utterance of a grieved and angry woman. For this reason I have not chosen to count it as an example of Lysianic repetition; it shows what the orator could do, and, by its position, what he habitually refrained from doing. The high fervor and dramatic pitch which Demos-

thenes brought upon the tribune Lysias found inappropriate, save when excused by the device of dramatization.

Asyndeton.

To discuss at length the employment of asyndeton in the three orators would be too large a task for the limits of this paper; a few observations will serve to indicate the development, extensive and intensive, which this construction received at the hands of Demosthenes. In the proportional number of occurrences we find a steady increase from Lysias through Isaeus to Demosthenes, the figures being:

Lys. 128 = 0.7 per Teub. p. Isae. 142 = 1.0 Dem. 302 = 1.6

A singularly regular progression appears in the introduction of documents or testimony, where asyndeton in the summons to the clerk or witness gives an effect of sharpness and eagerness. The total number of such commands, the instances of asyndeton, and the proportion of these to the whole, are:

Lys. 65 : 4 = .06 Isae. 83 : 10 = .12 Dem. 129 : 31 = .24

In the use of the weightiest form of asyndeton, the cumulative, Demosthenes exhibits a much greater advance on his predecessors:

Lys. 4 = .02 per Teub. p. Isae. 12 = .08 Dem. 43 = .2

Demosthenes employs asyndeton freely in emotional passages. Especially characteristic are the following abrupt utterances: *ἄξιόν γε* 28. 6; *οὐκ εἶτα μισθοῦν* 28. 7 [1]; *οὐ πρότερον* 31. 12; *ὁρᾷς τὸν Ἀ.* 36. 50; *ὦ βέλτιστ'* ib. 52; *οὐκ ἠδικοῦ* ib. 54; *ὀρθῶς γ' ὦ Π.* 37. 26; *ἐπ' ἐκείνοις* 38. 27; *οἶδα κἀγώ* 39. 12; *παῦσαι μέν* and *οὐδεὶς ἀπελαύνει* ib. 34; *πονηρὸς ὦ. ἄ. Ἀ.* 45. 80. Somewhat similar are, in Isaeus, the brusque *ἐρωτήσω σε* 11. 5, *οὐκ ἄξιον* ib. 47; but in general this orator uses asyndeton chiefly for the sake of emphasis. Characteristically Lysianic is its use in transitions or in a simple continuation of the narrative or argument; so *ἐστιώπων ἐγώ* 1. 14; *ὡμολόγει ταῦτα ποιεῖν* ib. 22; *ἔγωγ' ἂν ἄνισον* 4. 17; *πολλὰς ἄν* 7. 14 (where it is unnecessary to assume a lacuna, as is done by Scheibe

[1] The introductory clause preceding distinguishes this passage from the similar one in 38. 23, which seemed to suggest that that oration had not been carefully worked out. An asyndetic transition from one topic to another is not characteristic of the finished work of Demosthenes.

and by some other critics); ᾧ μὲν τρόπῳ 9. 13; οὐκ ἔχω 18. 24; προσέχουσι τὸν νοῦν 30. 23; πολὺ ἂν εἴη 32. 11. Such instances are rare in Demosthenes: οὗτος ἔλαβε 41. 3; ἔπινον ἑκάστοτ' 54. 3; πόλλ' ἂν εἰπεῖν ib. 44 (at the beginning of a brief epilogue; cf. Lys. 31. 34); πολλὰ δουλικά 57. 45; and so Isaeus 10. 22 τοῦτο μὲν οἶδ' ὅτι.

The tendency of Demosthenes to employ asyndeton in connection with warmth of tone is further indicated by his comparatively rare use of it in the quiet beginning of a narrative. The διήγησις is introduced by an asyndetic sentence in Lysias four times (9. 4, 12. 4, 17. 2, 32. 4), in Demosthenes twice (37. 4, 54. 3); in a secondary narrative it occurs twice in Lysias (1. 22, 13. 55), twice in Demosthenes (38. 12, 57. 41). Isaeus has it in secondary narrative 6. 19, where two asyndetic sentences occur in succession; in 10. 4 the διήγησις is introduced with γάρ, and then follows an asyndetic continuation, οὗτος ἔλαβε; this is the case also in Dem. 41. 3. Noteworthy is the triple asyndeton[1] in Isae. 7. 5, following on the introduction with γάρ; contrast Dem. 54. 3, where a sentence with οὖν is placed between the two asyndeta.

A not uncommon use of this construction is in clauses introduced by a demonstrative which contain a comment on or an explanation or resumption of what has just preceded. I do not refer here to the occurrence of such cases after documents or testimony, which is in general one of the weakest forms of asyndeton, though its possible vigor in mass may be seen from Dem. 28. 11–13. Where these clauses break the flow of the speech, they have usually, in Demosthenes, a warmth of tone which is less often to be felt in the other orators. Cf.

Lys. 1. 2. 17, 3. 13, 4. 11. 16, 9. 7, 13. 26. 31. 60. 71. 79. 81, 23. 9, 26. 20, 32. 21; with warmth 10. 28, 12. 20. 84, 13. 47.

Isae. 1. 10, 2. 20. 21, 3. 67, 5. 10, 7. 9. 16. 28. 45 *bis*, 8. 24, 11. 3. 42. 43; with warmth 2. 23. 37, 3. 23 *bis*, 5. 11, 7. 21. 23.

Dem. 27. 9, 29. 10, 30. 6. 14, 37. 36, 55. 25; with warmth 27. 25. 31, 30. 8. 24 *bis*. 38, 37. 41, 45. 2, 57. 65.

[1] Isae. 6. 19 and 7. 5 are not to be regarded as instances of cumulative asyndeton; this term is meant to include only those cases in which the asyndetic clauses are intimately connected, embodying essentially one idea and conveying an impression of rapidity. So in Dem. 28. 20 we have not one instance, but four, of cumulative asyndeton: σώσατ' ἐλεήσατε, ἱκετεύω ἀντιβολῶ, πρὸς—ὑμῖν, οὕτως—με. The pauses after ἠλέησαν, πεφεύγαμεν, ὑμῖν are strongly felt; they represent the catch in the breath, the breaking of the voice between these rapid utterances of passion.

The number of instances in each class is therefore:

Lys. 15:4, Isae. 14:7, Dem. 6:9.

It appears then that this kind of asyndeton is used more frequently by the two earlier orators than by Demosthenes, and that the latter oftener infuses into it a tone of strong feeling.

Of the prooemium in Lysias and Isaeus there is nothing to be said, save that neither orator anywhere exhibits that intense cultivation and exquisite finish of this part of the speech which were found in some orations of Demosthenes.

III.—Examination of Suspected Speeches.

The fact that this paper originated in a study[1] of Or. 34 led naturally to an examination of the other speeches dealing with questions of marine insurance; to these I have added Orr. 40 and 46 on account of their close connection with 39 and 45, respectively.

Or. 32.—Schäfer finds the speech against Zenothemis Demosthenic neither in composition nor in tone; Blass rejects it only for faults in method and argument. One of these lies in the fact that the demurrer is argued out in the prooemium; what has been said above concerning Orr. 36 and 37 shows that this anticipation is not Demosthenean. As the prooemium is faulty in substance, so in form it displays no delicacy of finish; and the concluding words have a tone not to be paralleled from Demosthenes. The speaker, after making the customary appeal for a fair hearing, says: *ἀκούσεσθε γὰρ ἀνθρώπου τόλμαν καὶ πονηρίαν οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, ἅπερ ἐγὼ τὰ πεπραγμέν' αὐτῷ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολλάκις εἰπεῖν δυνηθῶ. οἶμαι δέ.* The power of demonstration is always put by Demosthenes as a thing to be attempted (*πειράσομαι διδάσκειν* 27. 3, 30. 5, *εἰπεῖν π.* 31. 3, 36. 3, 45. 2, *π. δεῖξαι* 57. 1) and he expresses confidence only in the convincing force of facts (29. 1 *ἐκ δὲ τούτων οἶμαι—εὔγνωστον ἔσεσθαι*; ib. 5 *οὕτως μεγάλοις—ἐλέγχοις—ὥσθ'—εἴσεσθαι*; so 30. 5; 36. 3 *ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πεπραγμένων εἴσεσθε*; so 55. 3; 54. 2 *συγγνώμην ἕξετ' εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι—ἐπειδὰν—ἀκούσητε*); nowhere does he permit himself, or his client, such a touch of brusque arrogance as that which here offends good taste and strikes an inartistic note.

There is a fair proportion of deictic expressions (2. 6); the effective employment of the apostrophe in §28–30 recalls Dem. 37. 57;

[1] Published in the Johns Hopkins University Circular, No. 109, Feb. 1894.

the denunciatory words πονηρία (§2. 3) and ἀναίδεια (§9) are used with directness. Among other forms of interrogation the suggestion occurs once (§10), the challenge once (§27); but the rhetorical answer, in the vigorous form which sways opinion, is not found. The total absence of repetition seems significant; still more so the frequency of asyndeton in toneless passages. In §28, indeed, this figure is employed with force; but there are nine examples (§1. 10 ἔστ. ἐργ. 11 *bis*. 14. 17 ἐξ αὐτ. 18 *bis*. 26) of those asyndetic continuations which are altogether infrequent with Demosthenes. In §4 and §31 the clause in asyndeton stands in appositional relation to the preceding, as in Dem. 29. 3; but the short asyndetic sentences which break the direct quotations in §15 are as unlike Demosthenes as is that manner of narration (cf. Hug, cited by Blass, III 438). This lavish use of the unemphatic asyndeton suggests a study of Lysias and an exaggeration of one of the devices by which he achieved simplicity and avoided the appearance of rhetorical artifice; and the faint touches of irony in §12 and §27 might be copied from Lys. 32. 22. Neither in those two passages nor in §24 (τοῦ σοφοῦ) do we find anything resembling the ironic power of Demosthenes; and this fact, the weakness of the prooemium, the lack of repetition, and the dominant quality of the asyndeton seem to tell with conclusive weight against the genuineness of the speech, although at some points its style approaches the Demosthenic type.

Or. 33.—The well-knit and lucid speech against Apaturius is held together by an abundance of deictic words and phrases (3. 1), but exhibits otherwise none of the features which serve to mark the power and art of Demosthenes. There is a good deal of interrogation, but it is all assertive or argumentative; the suggestion is wanting, and the challenging tone is only slightly felt in §23 and §25; there is no rhetorical answer. The denunciatory phrase εἰς τοῦτο ἀναιδείας directed at the adversary in §22, at his confederate in §19, lacks sharp utterance, as, indeed, the qualities of sharpness and strenuousness are generally wanting in this pleasantly smooth and persuasive composition. The single instance of repetition lies in the sort of antistrophe at the close—a position which this figure nowhere has in any Demosthenean oration. Of irony in the Demosthenic sense there is none, and only an isolated touch of energetic reprobation in §37 (τὸ ῥᾷστον κ.τ.ἑ.). Asyndeton occurs only in a few passages, chiefly with weak tone: after testi-

mony (§9. 16), in indistinct apposition (§32–3), in a question (§37), at the beginning of the short epilogue (§38). It is worth while to compare Or. 55, which contains only seven examples of asyndeton (§13 *bis*. 15. 24 *bis*. 25. 31), by far the smallest number to be found in any of the fourteen speeches, but these almost wholly in warm or emphatic passages. These particulars only confirm the observation of Blass (III 515), that we miss here the life and power of Demosthenes; and in the prooemium we may note, not only the colorless and impersonal character on which Blass remarks, but also the strong contrast with the genuine prooemia; their tone is always intensely personal, save in Or. 57, where the generalizations are justified by the general movement of which Euxitheus finds himself unwillingly a part. Of the delicate workmanship, the fine threads of suggestion linking this part to the whole, such as are seen in the maturer speeches of Demosthenes, there is here no trace. As to the manner of introducing the demurrer in the prooemium and having the law at once read, this is at any rate more smoothly managed than the similar arrangement in Or. 38. But that speech, with all its imperfection, has the high artistic qualities of vividness and passion; this, which in its uniform, tame correctness, has all the necessary and none of the superfluous virtues, is stamped with a spiritual μετριότης possible to the art of Lysias, but not to the fiery temperament of Demosthenes.

Or. 34.—The speech against the merchant Phormio, condemned in brief terms alike by Schäfer and Blass as not of Demosthenic type, exhibits only characteristics confirmatory of their judgment. The prooemium is lacking as well in finish and suggestiveness as in the clearness and point that appear even in the lengthiest and least forcible of the genuine prooemia, that of Or. 29; the grounds for the demurrer are urged in §4, essential portions of the narrative are briefly recited in §2 and §5, and as a result of this anticipation the point at issue is loosely and diffusely stated (§5). A corresponding looseness in the construction of the whole is marked by the very small number of deictic expressions. The particles τοίνυν and μὲν οὖν are indeed used with sufficient frequency, the former eight, the latter seven times; of monitory verbs or demonstratives there are only some ten, and these are nowhere used with the accumulation characteristic of Demosthenes. The proportion, then, is about 1.7, equal to that of the passionate deuterology against Aphobus which stands lowest in this respect among

the genuine speeches. But Or. 34 is not at all passionate; the tone is argumentative throughout, and for argument Demosthenes, as we have seen, employs these turns of phrase lavishly and often in mass. In consequence of this weakness we find transitions which are very slightly marked, in §22 only by δή, in §46 by μὲν οὖν; in the former passage the writer proceeds with no sensible demarcation from narrative to argument, in the latter there is almost an absolute severance of connection. Repetition does not occur; the suggestive question and the challenge are alike absent, as is the rhetorical answer, save in the weak form of appeal (§49 μηδαμῶς ὦ ἄ. δ.). Asyndeton is very infrequent and without force (§2. 4. 16. 17. 50); even the asyndetic εἰκότως (§51), following not on a statement of fact but on an assumption, fails of the ringing effect which it has in Dem. 30. 37, 36. 25. 30, 57. 4; in a like case to this Demosthenes (57. 33) uses a connective, and the same distinction is made by Lysias (contrast Lys. 25. 27 with 16. 16, 26. 17). There is no irony, or at least that discovered by Blass in §35 is very faint and resides rather in the contrasted facts than in the colorless expression; a comparison with Lys. 12. 86 shows how a pointed neatness of phrase serves to bring out the irony of contrast, which is here obscured by diffuseness of utterance. The absence of this figure is the more striking as the case offered much opportunity for its use, and as apostrophe, which with Demosthenes is often ironical, is freely employed in long passages, §26–8 and §30–3. It is to be observed that the main arguments are brought forward in these passages, in the first of which apostrophe is doubled throughout with interrogation; Demosthenes is not accustomed to burden either of these lively figures with any weight of argument, and this large employment of both in such a use shows misapplication of rhetorical passion. The brief address to the judges in §32 and §33 might remind us of Dem. 36. 51 and 45. 80. 82; but there the speaker, having been as it were swept away in the torrent of apostrophic denunciation, recalls his real audience, turns to it, and seems under the compelling influence of passion to return again to his enemy; here, no such artistic effect is produced, because the fault in art which lies in arguing with the adversary is only felt the more upon renewal; the short, sharp turns of Demosthenes, such as we see in 36. 20, are not from, but to, the opponent. The effect of ταπεινότης, which these different phenomena produce, is heightened by the manner in which denun-

ciatory words are employed. Here a certain indirectness is apparent. Thus *κακούργημα* (§29) stands in an appeal (and contrast the reinforcement of *κακουργία* with *τέχνη* in 45. 39); *ἀδίκημα* (§7) is introduced without emphasis, as may be seen by comparison with the vigorous use of *ἄδικος* in the Demosthenean passages cited above; *πονηρός* (§20) is, so to speak, quoted as a finding of the court, and *ἀναισχύντως* (§19) has only a general application. On the other hand, as the final word before the formal epilogue we find *θηρίων*, a harsh epithet not used by Demosthenes, at least in any private oration; this, coming in at the last like a forcible-feeble splutter of wrath, is roughly destructive of the dignity which should belong to this part of the speech and which is always to be felt in the close of a Demosthenic oration.

Or. 35.—The speech against Lacritus contains most of the features which I have taken as tests of Demosthenic composition, and some of these do not altogether lack Demosthenic tone. Thus, in interrogation we meet with one example of the suggestion (§22), two of the challenge (§45. 49); the short apostrophic turns in §45. 46. 47. 49 have much the air of those noticed in the genuine orations. Asyndeton is freely employed, sometimes with force, though the cumulative form, found in all of the fourteen speeches excepting 31, is missing. Of repetition we have epanadiplosis in §16 (*οὑτοσὶ—οὗτος*), where the punctuation of Bekker is, I think, to be preferred to that of Dindorf and Blass; there is no pause, but a quick recovery of the dropped thread of speech. In §54 (*πῶς οὐκ ἀδικεῖσθε—πῶς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ*) a curious anacoluthic anaphora is to be noticed, which finds parallels in Isae. 2. 42–3 (*δεινὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα—πῶς οὐκ ἂν δ. τ. π.*), ib. 43 (*ταῦτ' ἐστὶ τὰ ποιοῦντα—τ. ἐ. τὰ λυποῦντα*), 9. 15 (*τῷ οὖν ἂν ὑμῶν φανείη πιστόν—πῶς τοῦτον πιστόν*), and in Lys. 12. 36 (*οὐκ οὖν δεινόν—οὐκ ἄρα χρή*), but not in Demosthenes, to whom anacoluthon seems to have been in general repugnant. The style of Isaeus is also recalled by the inartistic repetition of *γέγραπται ταῦτα* (§19. 22. 25), *Ἀθήναζε παρέχειν ἀνέπαφα* (§37. 39), *δεινὸς εἶναι* (§41). The proportion of deictic expressions (2.08 per page) is lower than in Or. 39, which does not deal with legal points, and which moreover, in the passionate suppositions that take the place of argument, supplies in some degree the want of ordinary transitional formulas by such interjectional substitutes as *εἶεν* (§13. 18. 30), *καλῶς* (§15). Further the particles *τοίνυν* and *μὲν οὖν* appear rarely, the second three times (§3. 21. 55), the first,

which is by far the favorite with Demosthenes, only once. The rhetorical answer occurs (§26), not however in the true Demosthenic form of curt affirmation or denial, but overloaded with angry denunciation. This overloading is observable throughout in a tone which Blass calls *witzelnd*, but which seems to me rather to denote unbridled indignation; the opening words (*οὐδὲν καινόν κ. τ. ἑ.*) have no coloring of ridicule or bitter jest, but are mere vehement abuse, and this recurs again and again to the end, and is especially marked in the irony, which is not cutting, like that of Demosthenes, but heavy and rough; cf. §16 (*μέγα πρᾶγμα*), 40. 41. 43 (*σοφώτατον*), 49 (*μόνον δίκαιον*). The vocabulary of invective is, as Blass remarks, lavish and coarse; there are as many utterances of this sort as in the earliest of the genuine speeches, 27, and the abusive effect is heightened by a reinforcement of one epithet with another which passes beyond the bounds of Demosthenic force into sheer violence. Compare, in addition to the instances cited by Blass, §12 (*πονηρότατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι*), 32 (*βδελυρίαν καὶ ψευδολογίαν*), 39 (*κακοῦργοι σοφισταὶ καὶ πονηροὶ ἄνθρωποι*). The failure in good taste and artistic reserve is strongly brought out by a comparison of this speech with 37 or 45. The opponent of Pantaenetus is also hotly indignant at the impudence of his adversary; as for Apollodorus, his anger, inflamed by personal hatred as well as by pecuniary losses, repels us by its implacable bitterness; but in each case the expression which Demosthenes lends to indignation gives it power and weight, and the blending of a fine and keen irony with an assumption of loftiness exalts the character of his client and humbles the adversary. The prooemium and epilogue too have the usual dignity of tone, each speech rising gradually into a storm of passion which at the close subsides into appeal. In Or. 35 there is neither superiority of attitude nor refinement of tone, and the virulence of the prooemium is reflected in the epilogue; compare the turgid phrases in §55 (*κολάζειν—σοφίζουσιν, πονηρῶν—πανουργοῦσι*) with the simple *τούτους τῆς ἄγαν κολακείας ἐπισχήσετε*, 45. 88, and with the nobly expressed plea for the maintenance of justice in 37. 60.

Or. 40.—The second speech against Boeotus cannot properly be compared with the first; the latter, turning on a point of sentiment, owes partly to this fact its surpassing liveliness and brilliant changefulness; the former, dealing with a matter of business, would naturally be more quiet and sober in coloring and tone.

Considering, indeed, the relations of the parties to the suit, we might look for some such mixture of strong feeling with close argument as is exhibited in Orr. 36 and 45; but the two brothers had perhaps hardly been intimate enough to feel that cordial hatred which distinguishes the quarrel between Phormio and Apollodorus. The speech displays, in fact, neither strength of passion nor marked force of reasoning; its lax structure is reflected in the comparative weakness of deictic expressions, the proportion of which (2.28) is about the same as in Or. 39. The lack of the apostrophe it has in common with Orr. 27 and 30; but how far it is from possessing the compact energy of these speeches appears by the almost complete absence of asyndeton, of which only two feeble examples occur (§21. 47). The want of that dramatic force which this figure often gives is further emphasized by the fact that we find neither the challenge, the suggestion, nor the rhetorical answer; in short, none of those abrupt and telling checks to the flow of speech by which Demosthenes at once fixes and reposes the attention. The rhetorical value of asyndeton could hardly be better illustrated than from this drowsy stream of constant polysyndeton; the reluctance to pause, which the persistent connectives indicate, gives the impression that the orator is afraid of not keeping the interest of his audience, and thus dulls the interest and fatigues the mind of the reader. This anxiety finds definite expression in the words *διὰ τὸ ὀλίγον εἶναί μοι τὸ ὕδωρ* (§38). Now the average length of the Demosthenean private speech is thirteen and a half pages—or, if we omit the two deuterologies, fourteen and a half; this one, with its sixteen and a half, seems quite long enough for an effective development of the case; compare, at the end of Orr. 36 and 38, the proud *ἐξέρα τὸ ὕδωρ*. It is true that Or. 41 ends with the words *πρὸς ὀλίγον ὕδωρ ἀναγκαζόμενος λέγειν*; but it is really very short (8½ pp.), and that final phrase at the close of a successfully completed demonstration is merely a dignified note of complaint, while this, occurring in the middle of the speech, produces an inartistic jar by revealing the doubts which beset the speaker's mind. I cannot therefore agree with the remark of Blass (III 454): "Ueberhaupt ist der Ausdruck . . . rednerisch kräftig"; it has persuasiveness to a degree, but no force. That the writer was a student of Demosthenes is suggested not only by the borrowings from the first speech against Boeotus, but also by the opening words of the prooemium, which

recall those of Or. 55, but lack their neatness and charm; here the general reflection is laid down in the usual serious way, there the ἄρα turns it into a discovery made by the speaker, and so gives us at once the vision of his wide-eyed innocence. The touches of insinuation in §8 (ἐπλησίαζεν κ. τ. ἑ.), 23 (οἶ—κομισάμενον), and the air of moral superiority in §12 (ἐγὼ δ'—ἐπείσθην αὐτῷ), 48–9 (κἀγὼ μὲν—ἀγαναχτεῖν) are sufficiently in the tone of the preceding speech to show that this writer wished to preserve to Mantitheus the attitude in which Demosthenes had placed him; but he lacked the ironic power by which the latter made this reserve appear the restraint imposed by a sense of right and decorum on a proud and energetic temperament. There is a slight touch of irony in §28 (ὥσπερ κλητῆρες) and an easy sneer in §32 (νὴ Δί' κ. τ. ἑ.); but these do not smack strongly of Demosthenes. Denunciation is direct enough in §20. 34. 43. 52, though the vocabulary is not altogether Demosthenean: we have κακοῦργος, κακουργῶν (κακουργῆσαι Dem. 45. 30), τόλμα, τολμηρός, ἐπίβουλος; the nominal form in these last gives an aggressive force hardly to be felt in the common use of the corresponding verbs. Repetition is found in two examples of anaphora (§42. 59) and one of the rare epanadiplosis (§53); but this last is an isolated instance of unusually vigorous expression, and the representation of this one figure does not make up for the absences and weaknesses which have been noted.

Or. 46.—The second speech against Stephanus must be set against the other deuterologies, 28 and 31; if it were by Demosthenes, we should expect to find it holding the same relation to Or. 45 that these do to their respective λόγοι. Now Or. 27 is, as has been said above, mainly concerned with exposition and argument, as is also Or. 30, one of the quietest in tone among the fourteen; and it is noteworthy that these two alone contain no example of apostrophe, which means that they are directed to the court, not at the adversary. But the very purpose of the second appearance is aggressive; in coming forward to refute his opponent the speaker enters inevitably upon attack; and the tone of the Demosthenean deuterologies is in accordance with this necessity of the situation. Apostrophe, irony, energetic asyndeton abound; the prevailing tone is exclamatory, eager, indignant; the arguments are brief and pointed, clinched by passionate utterance. On the other hand the two speeches against Stephanus show an

entirely different relation to each other. The first is rich in all the figures and devices which can enliven argument and convey feeling, while the second is merely an array of arguments; and this inversion shows a weakness alike in logic and in art wholly incompatible with any theory of Demosthenean authorship for 46. The other tests point to the same conclusion. The challenging question, indeed, and the apostrophe are found in combination (§25. 28), and there is an effective bit of irony (§19). But the suggestion and the rhetorical answer are wanting, as are too all forms of repetition; the vituperative word πανοῦργος is frank enough, but out of place at the very beginning; and the extremely infrequent use of asyndeton (§5. 14. 20) tells heavily against the speech. The proportion of deictic expressions (4. 8) is much higher than in any genuine oration; which seems at least to show that the writer recognized their value, perhaps too that he exaggerated their use beyond need.

Or. 56.—A. Schäfer has shown that the speech against Dionysodorus must have been delivered after the death of Demosthenes. It perhaps comes nearer to the Demosthenic type than any of the orations hitherto examined, containing as it does nearly all of the characteristic features on which I have laid stress. Denunciation is very slight, being in fact confined to the one word ἀναίσχυντος (§41); but this is uttered with much sharpness of emphasis. Anaphora occurs once (§10), epanadiplosis once (§38). Interrogation is abundant, with three instances of the suggestion (§2. 27. 38) and three of the challenge (§39 *bis*. 40); and there is an example of the rhetorical answer, §28. Asyndeton is quite frequent, and apostrophe is freely and effectively used; compare the rapid turning from the adversary to the judge and again to the adversary in §25, the argument rising into emphatic assertion, §26–8, and into denunciation, §40–2, the tone of challenge imparted to the argument in §32 and §39, and the vigorous insistence of §38. There are, however, other phenomena which, if the genuineness of the speech had to be decided on stylistic grounds, would tend to cast doubt upon it. The proportion of deictic expressions (2.0) is no higher than in Or. 55, and the preponderance of μὲν οὖν over τοίνυν (6 : 2) is not Demosthenic. The lengthy prooemium contains much general reflection in §1–2 and a long anticipation of the narrative in §3–4; in this, as in the whole speech, we miss the compact structure and pointed conciseness of the genuine orations.

Despite the employment of vivid figures, there is rarely any vivid sharpness and curtness; the livelier forms of question are dulled by length of phrase; and the asyndeton in §45, which might fairly be called cumulative, lacks, by reason of the same lengthiness, all the rapidity and weight that should belong to this figure. On the whole, asyndeton is employed (§7. 21. 22. 23. 27. 36. 37. 40. 46) rather for deliberate emphasis than in any warm or quick tone, though there is force in the rhetorical answer and in θεάσασθε, §40. Irony is found in §40 (ὦ βέλτιστε) and §41 (οὕτως ἀνδρεῖος), in the latter case passing immediately into denunciation; but these are slight instances, and the scornful familiarity of the vocative has less propriety here than in 36. 52, where it is justified by the intimacy of the two enemies and by the tone of lofty rebuke which pervades that passage. In short, the excellences of Or. 56 are not superlative; the writer is master of his art so far as it was to be learned, while lacking the power and subtlety of expression which only high artistic endowment could give.